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Abstract I present a concrete DRT-based syntax and semantics for the representa-
tion of mental states in the style of Kamp (1990). This system is closely related to
Recanati’s (2012) Mental Files framework, but adds a crucial distinction between
anchors, the analogues of mental files, and attitudes like belief, desire and imagi-
nation. Attitudes are represented as separate compartments that can be referentially
dependent on anchors. I show how the added distinctions help defend the useful
notion of an acquaintance-based mental file against Ninan’s (Inquiry 58(4):368–377
2015) recent challenge involving counterfactual de re attitudes.
1 Introduction
In a previous special issue on Mental Files, Ninan (2015) argues that non-doxastic
attitudes challenge Recanati’s (2012) account. His counterexample runs as follows.
Lucy does not realize that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain and believes that Twain
is famous but Clemens is not. This is just a basic Frege puzzle: Lucy’s beliefs are
de re and involve distinct modes of presentation of a single res. On Recanati’s view
this means Lucy has two distinct mental files that both refer to the same individual.
Lucy’s Clemens-file will have the predicate IS NOT FAMOUS inscribed in it, while
her Twain-file contains IS FAMOUS. Now, Ninan observes, this mental files analy-
sis of Frege cases does not extend to counterfactual attitudes like imagination. Say,
Lucy imagines that things were the other way around, i.e. Samuel Clemens is famous
but Mark Twain is not. Again, we’re dealing with two incompatible de re attitudes
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about the same individual, so these attitudes must again involve distinct Clemens- and
Twain-files. But how can Lucy’s Clemens-file, which contains IS NOT FAMOUS,
capture her mental state of imagining that he is famous?
Apparently there is an asymmetry between the attitudes of belief and imagination
in the way the attitudinal contents relate to what’s in the files. Ninan then, helpfully,
suggests a possible way for Recanati to deal with this:
Perhaps Recanati has a different picture in mind. Maybe Lucy’s mind can be
thought of as divided up into boxes corresponding to the different types of atti-
tudes that she has: there is a belief box, a desire box, an imagination box, etc.
Lucy’s belief box contains a Clemens-file, as does her imagination box (per-
haps these two files are in some way linked). If Lucy imagines that Clemens
is famous and Twain is not, then the Clemens-file in her imagination box has
the predicate IS FAMOUS inscribed on it, even though the Clemens-file in
her belief box has the predicate IS NOT FAMOUS inscribed on it. The predi-
cates inscribed on the files in her belief box are irrelevant to the content of her
imagining. (Ninan 2015:376)
Recanati’s (2015) reply shows that he does indeed think an analysis along these lines–
supplemented with an account of file-linking in terms of generalized indexing–may
be among the viable solutions. But Ninan ends on a pessimistic note:
Perhaps some such story could be told. But note one upshot of extending the
account in this way: one can no longer characterize mental files as mental repre-
sentations whose primary function is to carry information about objects. (Ninan
2015:376)
In this paper I show that “some such story” can and has been told, viz. by Kamp
(1990,. . .,2015), Asher (1986, 1987), and myself (2015b, c, 2016) working in the
framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). Moreover, I will show how
the DRT analysis of compartmentalized mental states allows us to “characterize men-
tal files as mental representations whose primary function is to carry information
about objects.”
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first introduce basic DRT (Section 2) and
then reconstruct a version of the DRT-based representational theory of mental states
that I will refer to as Attitude Description Theory (ADT) (Section 3). I demonstrate
the ADT framework by applying it to some philosophically interesting phenomena,
paying special attention to any differences between Kamp’s ADT and Recanati’s
Mental Files (Section 4). I then present a more precise formalization of the syntax
and semantics of ADT (Section 5). I end by showing how ADT deals with Ninan’s
challenge (Section 6).
2 Discourse Representation Theory
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp & Reyle 1993) is typically pre-
sented as a specific type of formal semantics, well suited for dealing with semantics/
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pragmatics interface phenomena like presupposition and anaphora resolution. DRT’s
formal language of Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs) is then used to rep-
resent the Stalnakerian common ground between speaker and hearer. The explanatory
power of the framework lies in the algorithms for updating these common ground
representations in response to linguistic utterances.
To illustrate the basic DRT framework, consider (1).
(1) A woman is standing outside.
In DRT, utterances are interpreted as updates on a context, represented as a DRS.
Let’s assume we’re starting with an empty context DRS when we hear (1). The
indefinite a woman introduces a new discourse referent into the common ground.






This boxy formula is read as ‘there exists an x that has the properties of being
a woman and of standing outside’. In other words, with the standard syntax and
semantics of the DRS language (cf. Kamp & Reyle, 1993), (2) is truth-conditionally
equivalent to (and recursively translatable into) the first-order formula ∃x[woman(x)
∧ stand.outside(x)].1 To illustrate the dynamic character of the theory, let’s say that
the speaker of (1) continues with (3).
(3) She’s smoking.
The subject of this sentence is a pronoun, she, which is treated not as introducing new
material but as looking for a previously established (“familiar”) discourse referent to
bind to. In this case, the pronoun, initially represented as ‘?’, can be bound to the











The final output represents the truth-conditions of the whole two-sentence discourse:
there’s a woman standing outside smoking.
The analysis of anaphora has been extended significantly to provide, for instance,
one of the leading theories of presupposition van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts
1The original semantics of DRT is static, so its dynamic aspect lies wholly in its construction algorithm,
i.e., the way it turns sentences into DRS updates. Later presentations of the framework also add a dynamic
semantics in terms of Heimian context change potentials.
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(1999). Other areas where DRT shines include quantification, tense and aspect, and
propositional attitude ascriptions.
What is often glossed over in such linguistic applications – even in many anal-
yses of attitude ascriptions, including my own 2010 – is Kamp’s (1981) original
motivation of reconciling Fregean formal semantics (as championed at the time by
Montague (1973)) with a traditional, Lockean cognitive theory of communication
in terms of speakers’ and hearers’ mental states. To this end, Kamp in his original
presentations actually describes DRSs as representations of the mental state of the
hearer, rather than of the more abstract notion of a Stalnakerian common ground.
What sets this cognitive conception of DRT apart from purely cognitive theories like
Fauconnier’s (1994) Mental Spaces, is that the DRS language has a precise syntax
and model-theoretic interpretation. Hence, in addition to its cognitive interpretation,
a DRS also represents the actual truth conditions of a sentence or discourse.
Linguists have since stripped DRT of its cognitive interpretation. But Kamp and
a few others have kept it alive, even extending DRT to a full-blown representational
theory of attitudes (Kamp 1990; Asher 1986). In the following sections I present a
version of such a DRT-based theory of mental states known as Attitude Description
Theory (ADT).
3 Anchors and Attitudes
The starting point of ADT is that mental states are (i) compartmentalized into beliefs,
desires, fears, intentions, etc., and (ii) these compartments are highly interconnected.
For instance, my mental state could contain the belief that there’s a monster under my
bed and, dependent on that belief, the hope that it won’t wake up. This dependence
is cashed out in the same way as anaphoric dependencies in discourse are modeled in
standard DRT, viz. by sharing accessible discourse referents.
To model singular attitudes, Kamp further introduces the notion of “entity
representations” or “internal anchors”. These internal anchors contain descriptive
information about the way we are acquainted with particular objects in the world
around us. An anchor thus serves as a cognitive mode of presentation of the object
that is the causal source of a certain de re attitude. Kamp’s internal anchors are rem-
iniscent of what philosophers have called dossiers (Grice 1969), or mental files (e.g.
Perry 1980; Recanati 2012). In the following I will stick with the term anchor, and
note where Kamp’s and Recanati’s accounts diverge.
By way of illustration of the theory thus far, the so-called Attitude Description
Set (ADS) below represents the mental state I’m in when I look in my pigeon hole
at work and see an envelope, believe it’s publisher’s junk mail, hope it’s a letter of
acceptance for a recent grant application, and intend to open it right away.2
2I do not distinguish between different buletic attitudes such as hoping, wanting, and desiring. I label them
all DES, and interpret them in terms of a set of so-called buletic alternatives.











BEL junk(x) , DES acceptance(x) , INT open(i,x)
This ADS contains at the global level two perceptual anchors, representing my per-
ceptual acquaintance with the letter and the mailbox it’s in. Formally, an anchor
consists of a label (ANCH) and a DRS that introduces a new anchored discourse ref-
erent along with the acquaintance-based descriptive mode of presentation that the
agent associates with it.3
Below the anchors we find three attitude descriptions (a belief, a desire, and
an intention), again consisting of a label (BEL,DES,INT) and a DRS that gives the
descriptive content of the attitude. A key feature of the framework is that discourse
referents may be shared across anchors and attitudes. In our example the first anchor
uses a discourse referent introduced in the second, and all three attitudes use the dis-
course referent x. We’ll say that these attitudes referentially depend on the anchor for
the letter, which in turn referentially depends on the anchor for the mailbox. Finally,
to model de se attitudes there is a special, essentially indexical discourse referent
i, which we may think of as introduced by an implicit, non-descriptive anchor that
represents the agent’s self (cf. Section Section 4.1).
The actual causal sources of internal anchors are represented outside of the ADS
proper. Kamp formalizes the causal links between a mental state and its surround-
ings as a mapping from discourse referents to entities. In our example, this so-called
“external anchor” maps x to the actual letter, y to the mailbox, and i to me:
(6)
⎡




The external anchor allows us to capture singular attitudes: any attitude com-
partment that depends on (i.e., makes use of) a discourse referent introduced by an
externally anchored internal anchor represents a genuinely singular attitude, about
the causal source of that internal representation. In our example all three attitudes,
the belief, the hope, and the intention depend on the anchor introducing x, represent-
ing the letter as something I am seeing in my mailbox. Consequently, they are about
the causal source of that mental representation, the actual letter.
Before I go into the formal semantics in Section 5, let me further illustrate the
power of the representational framework by applying it to some more interesting
phenomena and scenarios from the philosophical literature.
3Exactly what kind of information counts as representing a relation of acquaintance between subject and
res and thus belongs in an internal anchor is a delicate matter that I will return to in Section 4.3 below.
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4 Case Studies
4.1 Attitudes de se
We use the dedicated indexical discourse referent i to represent the subject’s first per-
son de se center. Similarly, we could use n to model the subject’s subjective now, but
for simplicity I’ll ignore the temporal domain throughout. In (7) we see a fragment
of the mental state of Lingens who self-ascribes the property of being a lost amne-
siac, while reading about Lingens in an encyclopedia and learning that this Lingens














The crucial realization that follows this state of confusion in Perry’s story, that he
himself is Lingens, can then be represented by adding the condition ‘x=i’ to the
belief box in (7).
Note that there is no explicit anchor introducing the discourse referent i in (7).
The idea is that, since we’re assuming that every mental state contains a unique, non-
descriptive, first person representation of the self we can suppress such an anchor in
our ADS notations.
The implicit self-anchor is like other anchors in that it introduces a discourse ref-
erent that is thereby accessible to all attitudes and other anchors. However, Kamp
(2011) assumes a fundamental distinction between de re and de se, based on the
idea that subjects have a privileged, direct access to themselves, ‘unencumbered by
any form of descriptive content’ (p.8) and ‘immune to error through misidentifica-
tion’ (p.51) (i.e., when I self-ascribe being a linguist there can be no mistake that
the person I’m ascribing this property to is me, but when I ascribe being a linguist
de re to the person I see in the mirror I might be confused about who it is, or even
whether there is anyone there at all). More on hallucination and faulty perception in
Section 4.3, but I should note here already that on this point Kamp’s view diverges
from that of Recanati, who pleads for of a more uniform approach to de re and de
se attitudes based on the idea that the actual reference of a mental file is always
fully independent of its descriptive content, and hence that de re reference is always
‘direct’ and ‘unencumbered’ by any (accurate or inaccurate) descriptive information.
Pending a more thorough exploration of this disagreement over the de re/de se dis-
tinction, I will follow Kamp in this paper. In Section 5.3 I will cash out the special
status of the self semantically by treating i as an indexical that picks out the center of
any doxastic alternative of the agent.4
4Equivalently, we can think of an attitude DRS K containing i as expressing the property expressed by
λi.K .
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4.2 Double Vision
The philosophical literature on attitudes and ascriptions is replete with puzzles where
an agent forms two distinct representations of something, failing to realize that it is
actually the same thing: Frege’s Babylonians see a distinct morning and evening star,
Quine’s Ralph sees mayor Ortcutt as distinct from the suspicious figure in the alley,
Kripke’s Pierre believes London is terrible, but Londres is pretty, Perry’s shopper
believes himself to be distinct from the shopper with the torn sack, etc. In the current
framework, each of these cases involves a mental state description with two distinct
files, each associated with different descriptive contents based on the different ways
of being acquainted with an entity, but the external anchor maps both files to the same
real-world entity, the actual causal source.


















In Pierre’s mental representation of the world there are two distinct cities: one is
the city he read about in his childhood in France, called Londres; the other is the
city he lives in, called London. Based on these two epistemic links, he has formed
two mental files, and through these he can have singular beliefs, hopes, etc.. We,
as outside observers, know that his beliefs are in fact inconsistent. As represented
in (8) by the external anchor, both mental files derive from a single source, so both
beliefs are in fact de re about the same city. However, intuitively, the fact that Pierre
believes the one city to be pretty and the other not does not entail that Pierre himself
is irrational in the sense that his internal mental state is logically inconsistent.
To reconcile this apparent contradiction I will provide in Section 5 a model-
theoretic semantics for mental state descriptions that defines both a narrow and a
wide content of attitudes. The narrow content of Pierre’s beliefs as represented in (8)
should be computed on the basis of the descriptive conditions in the belief box and the
internal anchors on which those depend. More specifically, the narrow belief content
expressed by (8) should be the (centered) proposition that the city the subject knows
as ‘Londres’ is pretty and the city he knows as ‘London’ is not. This gives us the
non-contradictory interpretation that captures what goes on in Pierre’s head, and that
should explain his actions and practical reasoning. By contrast, the wide content of
Pierre’s beliefs is computed by evaluating the same belief conditions, but relative to
the external anchor, bypassing the descriptive content in the internal anchors. Com-
puting the wide content of (8) will give us the singular proposition about London that
it is both pretty and not pretty, a genuine contradiction.
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4.3 Faulty Perception
So far we’ve mostly discussed anchors based on actual acquaintance relations. For-
mally, the internal anchors we’ve encountered were all externally anchored. Given
that anchors are supposed to represent the objects of our de re attitudes, based on our
acquaintance with our surroundings, this is as it should be. Hence, Kamp’s (2011)
slogan: “no internal anchor without an external anchor”. But what if I merely hallu-
cinated seeing the letter in my mailbox (in the scenario from Section 3)? My narrow
mental state in such a scenario will be the same as before, i.e., I cannot distinguish
between the two situations. But now there is no causal source, i.e., no external anchor
for my internal anchor representation of the letter. Consequently, the narrow con-
tents of my belief, desire, and intention, remain the same while no wide content is
expressed by my attitudes (that I take to be) about the letter.
In order to accommodate such cases, I follow a suggestion from Recanati (2012)
to the effect that the external grounding of all mental files constitutes a normative
requirement: internal anchors should be, and hence can be expected to be, externally
anchored. The agent, in any case, assumes all her internal anchors to be externally
anchored. Thus, the internal anchor for the letter in my mailbox plays the same role
inside my mental life regardless of whether it’s properly anchored or hallucinated.
Kamp goes one step further: if a mental file “has no external anchor correspond-
ing to the representation’s internal anchor (i.e. there is no entity to which agent
and representation are causally related in the way the internal anchor describes),
then the internal anchor is ‘ungrounded”’ (Kamp 2011:5, emphasis added). In other
words, not only does an internal anchor presuppose an external anchor, the descrip-
tive content of the anchor needs to mirror precisely the actual causal relation between
agent and res. As before, this extra matching requirement is best thought of as a
normative ideal that, in reality, is not always achieved. In other words, the agent
herself will always assume all her internal anchors to be externally anchored to indi-
viduals that actually exemplify the properties associated with them in the internal
anchor DRSs.
Nonetheless, Kamp’s strong matching requirement imposes an important restric-
tion on the kind of information that belongs to the internal anchor. Only information
about the way I’m acquainted with the object, e.g. as “the rectangular object I see
now right in front of me in my hands”, should go into the internal anchor. By contrast,
information that I then gather or infer about or otherwise associate with that object
should go into a belief box referentially dependent on such an anchor. Where to draw
the exact line between these two types of content however is an open question – in
fact it’s just the old question of what counts as a relation of acquaintance, or what
are the conditions under which we form de re attitudes. Concretely, going back to
my representation of the letter example (5) from Section 3, conditions like ‘see(i,x)’
and ‘in.front.of(i,x)’ indeed belong in the internal anchor, while ‘junk(x)’, represent-
ing my belief that the envelope contains junk mail, is correctly represented as a (de
re) belief about the letter instead. But how about the information that what I see is an
envelope, is made of paper, is white? Or the information that x bears a certain name,
or that y uses a certain expression to refer to x (cf. Section 4.4)? Since a proper theory
of acquaintance and names is beyond the scope of this paper I will leave this decision
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for a future occasion. For now I’ll continue to put information about both perceptual
links and names in internal anchors.5
This brings us back to the divergence between Kamp and Recanati that we first
came across in discussing the de se in Section 4.1. As I said there, Recanati sees the
content of the file as being independent of the actual relation of acquaintance:
What [mental files] refer to is not determined by properties which the subject
takes the referent to have (i.e. by information—or misinformation—in the file),
but through the relations on which the files are based. The reference is the entity
we are acquainted with (in the appropriate way), not the entity which best ‘fits’
information in the file. (Recanati 2012:35)
By contrast, we just saw that Kamp holds that the referent, i.e. the external anchor,
should fit the descriptive information in the file, i.e. the internal anchor. Interestingly,
this disagreement between Kamp and Recanati may well be related to Ninan’s argu-
ment, discussed in Section 1, and the way it is resolved in ADT, as we will see in
Section 6. Since Recanati does not distinguish mental file content from beliefs (and
other attitudes), his files must allow all the information that an agent associates with
a res, not just the relational acquaintance information.
4.4 Proper Names and Vicarious Anchors
Not all mental files derive from direct perception. For instance, I have a mental file
on Aristotle that is based on book reading and hearing other people use the name. My
Aristotle file is externally anchored to the actual philosopher Aristotle and this allows
me to have de re beliefs and imaginations about him, despite the fact that I have no
direct perceptual relation to this ancient philosopher. In this case, the “epistemically
rewarding” acquaintance link between Aristotle and me is not direct, but involves a
long causal–historical chain of communication (a` la Kripke 1980).
Kamp (2015) introduces the notion of a vicarious anchor to describe such de re
attitudes based on testimony with proper names.
A vicarious anchor is established by some agent H who is witness to an act
of reference by another agent S, and who, on the basis of this, establishes an
entity representation R for the referent of that act. The vicarious internal anchor
of that representation is the mark of this referential intention on the part of H
and it is what makes [the vicarious internal anchor] into a representation of that
referent. (Kamp 2015, 283–284)
A vicarious anchor is like a regular perceptual anchor in that it signals a referential
intention. It differs from a perceptual anchor in that it doesn’t directly refer to its
source, but defers the interpretation to another agent. Vicarious anchoring thus allows
5In recent work, Kamp (2015:286-287) proposes an alternative picture, where an “entity representation”
contains both a set of internal anchor DRSs containing acquaintance-based content (like ‘see(i,x)’), and a
DRS containing descriptive contents (like ‘philosopher(y)’ or ‘name(x,John)’). It is not clear to me at this
point what, if anything, is the difference between the belief box in the current proposal and the descriptive
part of such a complex entity representation.
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the agent to have singular attitudes about some individual she has no direct perceptual
acquaintance with, other than hearing someone use their name.
We capture vicarious anchoring – at least for names – with a condition
‘refer(x,y,z)’ (speaker x used expression y to refer to z). For instance, when my wife
starts talking to me about how Susan was being obnoxious at work today and I can-
not link this name to any of my existing internal anchors, I may introduce into my









5 A Model-Theoretic Interpretation
ADSs may give a pretty picture of, say, Pierre’s mental state, but what does it really
mean to say that Pierre has a mental state as described in (8)? In what sense does
Pierre’s mind contain a set of labeled DRSs?
5.1 Possible Worlds and Attitudes
I take as my point of departure the familiar possible worlds conception of proposi-
tions and beliefs. A person’s beliefs are described by a set of possible worlds, her
doxastic alternatives. We can explicate the notion of a doxastic alternative as follows:
w′ is a doxastic alternative of a in w (notation: w′ ∈ Dox(a,w)) means that if you
take a from world w, freeze her mental state, and place her in world w′, she will
not be able to tell the difference. We then say that this person believes the proposi-
tion that it is raining iff all her doxastic alternatives are worlds where it is raining: a
believes proposition p(⊆ W) in w iff Dox(a,w) ⊆ p.
In order to deal with the essentially indexical discourse referent i we switch
from worlds and propositions to centered worlds (formalized as world–individual
pairs) and centered propositions (i.e., sets of centered worlds), respectively. We take
Dox(a,w) to denote a set of centered worlds, i.e. 〈w′, a′〉 ∈ Dox(a,w) means that
if you place a in w′ and let her experience it from the perspective of a′, she will
be unable to distinguish it from w as experienced from her own perspective (Lewis
1979; Haas-Spohn 1994). We then formalize de se belief as follows: Lingens in w
believes de se that he is lost (or: Lingens self-ascribes in w the property of being lost)
iff Dox(Lingens, w) ⊆ {〈w′, a′〉|a′ is lost in w′}.
As a first approximation, let’s assume the same story applies to other attitudes:
to model desires we have Bul(a,w) denoting the set of a’s centered buletic alter-
natives in w, and for imagination we have a set of imagination alternatives. A
person’s full mental state can thus be characterized as a sequence of subsets of
C, the set of centered worlds. Formally, these attitude characterizations of peo-
ple across possible worlds are part of the model, i.e., a model M is a tuple
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〈D,W, I, 〈Dox,Bul, Img . . .〉〉 with C = D × W , and Dox,Bul, Img, . . . : C →
P(C).
So how do we relate this Lewis/Hintikka-style set-theoretic conception of an
agent’s various attitudes, to our syntactic, DRT-based mental state descriptions? The
central definition of ADT semantics says that an ADS K is a correct (partial)
description of a’s mental state in w iff the narrow contents of the belief, desire, imag-
ination, etc. components within K are compatible with the corresponding sets of
doxastic, buletic, imaginative etc. alternatives of a in w.
Making this precise, taking into account also the anchors in K , requires a model-
theoretic interpretation of the various labeled parts of a mental state description in
terms of centered worlds. This in turn requires an intensional semantics for standard
DRT, which I sketch below.
5.2 The Syntax and Semantics of Basic DRT
Let’s start with some syntactic terminology. A DRS consists of two compartments.
The top compartment, U(K), the so-called universe, contains the discourse referents.
The bottom part, Con(K) contains the conditions, which are either atomic formulas
(e.g. see(y,x)), or complex ones containing subDRSs (e.g. ¬K ′ or K ′ → K ′′).
The central notion of DRT semantics is that of a verifying embedding, which is
a partial function from the set of discourse referents to the model’s domain D. For
our current purposes we need an intensional parameter. Since we take doxastic and
buletic alternatives to be centered worlds, we’re going to need those as our inten-
sional parameter. We say that an embedding g verifies a DRS K in c iff it verifies all
conditions of K:
(10) g |=c K iff for allψ ∈ Con(K) : g |=c ψ.
Condition verification is defined by cases. For example:
(11)
a. g |= cP (x1, . . . xn)iff 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ Ic(P )
b. g |= c¬K ′iff there is noh ⊇ g with Dom(h) = Dom(g) ∪ U(K ′) and
h |= cK ′.
The essential indexical discourse referent i can be dealt with as a special case
of “anchoring” as it was originally developed for standard DRT by Kamp and
Reyle (1993). Like the later external anchors of ADT, an anchor here is just a partial
embedding that fixes the reference of a number of discourse referents. For i we add
a global stipulation that fixes its reference to ac, the agent parameter of the centered
world of evaluation c. Our central definition of truth involves the truth of a DRS K
in a centered world c relative to an anchor f :
(12) Kfc = 1 iff there is an embedding g ⊇ f such that Dom(g) = U(K) ∪ {i}
andg |=c K, and, moreover, g(i) = ac.
From there we can define also the (centered) proposition expressed by K relative to







The centered proposition expressed by DRS K simpliciter is a special case: K =
K∅.
This concludes our crash course in DRT syntax and semantics. Now let’s return to
the syntax and semantics of ADSs.
5.3 Towards a Syntax and Semantics of ADT
An ADS contains descriptions of various mental files and attitudes in the form of
labeled DRSs (boxes). We’ll need to decide how to line up these components of the
ADS with the attitude sets provided by the model. The idea is to match the BEL-
labeled DRS with the set of doxastic alternatives, the DES-labeled DRS with the
buletic alternatives, etc. We run into a number of complications here, so to keep things
manageable I’ll suggest some effective simplifications.
The first complication is that Kamp’s ADSs may contain various, distinct BEL-
or DES-labeled DRSs, but the Kripke/Hintikka model provides only one set of dox-
astic alternatives for an agent (at a given time and world). One of the reasons for
allowing multiple belief boxes is to address the problem of logical omniscience using
the fragmentation strategy of Lewis (1982): a mental state can contain distinct belief
compartments, which, taken together would be inconsistent. I will simply ignore this
orthogonal issue here and assume that an ADS contains at most one DRS per attitude
label (cf. Maier 2015c for a semantics that does take into account fragmentation).
We can now use convenient notations like KIMG to refer to the IMG-labeled DRS
component of an ADS K . For concreteness, let’s further restrict attention to the
attitudes of belief, desire, and imagination. In other words, we’ll consider only ADSs











One final restriction is that I will focus only on dependencies involving anchors,
ignoring potential dependencies between attitudes.6 With these restrictions in place
we can already define the wide contents of the various attitudes in an externally
anchored ADS 〈K , f 〉 (where K is an ADS of the form in (14) and f an external
anchor that maps all internally anchored discourse referents in K to elements in
the domain D of the model). The belief content expressed by 〈K , f 〉 is simply the
proposition expressed by the BEL-labeled DRS inK , relative to external anchor f , as
defined in standard DRT (cf. (13)): KBELf . The same holds for the other attitudes.
The wide content of my hope in the letter example is then the set of centered worlds
in which the actual letter, the causal source of my internal anchor, is a notification
of acceptance. Pierre’s wide belief content is the set of worlds w such that the actual
city, London, is pretty in w and not pretty in w, i.e., the empty set.
Note that internal anchors and the attitudes provided by the model play no role
in the definition of wide content; (14) just defines the singular propositions actually
6We could easily add belief dependence to the system below, but desires or beliefs dependent on an imagi-
nation are more difficult (and also controversial). This limitation of the current system is one of the primary
reasons for introducing much heavier formal machinery in my 2015c proposal.
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expressed by mental states. Psychologically speaking, whether or not K accurately
describes someone’s mental state (given by the model) has nothing to do with such
singular propositions. As announced in Section 4.2, to capture the psychological
interpretation (that can explain for instance the agent’s behavior) we need a different
notion of attitude content: narrow content. In determining, say, narrow desire con-
tent, the free discourse referents in the desire box should get their reference fixed not
by the external anchor, but by the descriptive content in the internal anchors.
Internal anchors introduce some further complications. First of all, what attitude
should we associate with ANCH? That is, what attitude – if any – does an agent have
toward the content of her mental files. From the three attitudes considered so far,
belief is the most promising candidate. If an internal anchor contains the descriptive
condition ‘see(i,x)’ or ‘named(x,Londres)’ this entails that I believe that I’m seeing x,
or that x is called ‘Londres’. The interpretation of internal anchors as beliefs is con-
sistent with the views of both Recanati, as brought out in the discussion with Ninan
reconstructed in Section 1, and Kamp et al. (2003).7 Now, the first complication
comes up again: there are multiple anchors and only one set of belief alternatives. To
get around this I will just assume that all internal anchors and the belief box merged
together describe things that the agent believes to be the case.8
We are now in a position to formulate the central definition of ADT semantics a
bit more precisely. The idea is to use the intensional DRT semantics to compute the
propositions expressed by the merged belief-plus-anchors DRS (notation: K1ANCH ⊕
. . .⊕KnANCH ⊕KBEL), the desire DRS (KDES), and the imagination DRS (KIMG), and
then compare those propositions with the sets of doxastic, buletic and imaginative
alternatives in the usual Hintikka/Kripke fashion:
(15)
An ADS K captures an agent a’s mental state in w iff
a. Dox(a,w) ⊆ K1ANCH ⊕ . . . ⊕ KnANCH ⊕ KBEL
b. Bul(a,w) ⊆ KDES [to be revised]
c. Img(a,w) ⊆ KIMG [to be revised]
For some very simple examples where all non-doxastic attitude components in an
ADS are self-contained, proper DRSs this will give adequate results. However, the
whole point of the ADS structure is to allow referential dependencies between atti-
tudes, which involves attitude DRSs with free variables. In the letter example, for
instance, we saw the singular hope that it – the letter – is a notification of acceptance.
Formally, the desire DRS in that example contains the free variable x and hence does
not express a proposition: KDES in (15b) is undefined.
In sum, the classical proposition-based approach fails because attitudes that are
referentially dependent on other attitudes do not express propositions. There are sev-
eral solutions to this problem. Kamp’s own proposal, for instance, uses a dynamic
rather than static DRT semantics, because that allows him to assign appropriate
semantic values to DRSs with free variables (cf. Kamp et al. 2003). Below I will
7A plausible, weaker alternative I’ve discussed elsewhere in connection with fictional anchors is the view
that anchors contain material that the agent accepts (Maier 2015a).
8DRS merge is defined as follows: K1 ⊕ K2 = 〈U(K1) ∪ U(K2), Con(K1) ∪ Con(K2)〉.
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present a simpler, more conservative, but less general solution for our (already
stripped down) ADS syntax. Nonetheless, the proposal below is still expressive
enough to deal with all the philosophically interesting cases discussed above, as
well as Ninan’s example discussed in Section 1. For a more comprehensive seman-
tic treatment of ADSs with arbitrary numbers of distinct, possibly conflicting belief
fragments, as well as arbitrary chains of dependencies between any number and type
of attitudes in an ADS, I refer the reader to Maier (2015c).9
The problem with (15) was that we could have free variable in KDES and KIMG.
Note first that we don’t have this problem with belief. The free variables in a belief
box are taken care of by merging the belief with the anchors in (15a). This simple
fix won’t work for other attitudes because merging the anchors in (15b) would entail
that the agent wants the contents of her mental files to be satisfied.
What we need is an external anchor to fix the reference of these free imagina-
tion/desire variables “in the background”. But where do we get such an external
anchor from? Answer: we construct it from interpreting the material in the internal
anchors. In other words, we want to evaluate the desire and imagination components
of the ADS relative to embeddings and doxastic alternatives that verify the conditions
in the internal anchors.
Anticipating Ninan’s example, a proper implementation of this idea requires that
we replace Bul and Img with two-dimensional or “parasitic” notions of desire
and imagination, Bul∗ and Img∗. Following a suggestion from Ninan (2008)
two-dimensional attitudes specify the agent’s buletic and imaginative alternatives
only relative to a centered world the agent believes to inhabit. More precisely,
Img∗(a,w, c), say, is the set of worlds compatible with what the agent a in w would
imagine if her belief set were the singleton {c}, i.e. if she were convinced she was
ac inhabiting wc without any uncertainty (cf. Ninan 2008:43–44 for more detailed
motivation for such a primitive two-dimensional notion of imagination).
The definitive narrow psychological semantics for ADT can now be stated as
follows:
(16)
An ADSK captures the mental state of a in w iff
a. Dox(a,w) ⊆ K1ANCH ⊕ . . . ⊕ KnANCH ⊕ KBEL
b. for all c ∈ Dox(a,w) and allf with Dom(f ) = U(K1ANCH ⊕ . . . ⊕ KnANCH)
and f |=c K1ANCH ⊕ . . . ⊕ KnANCH and f (i) = ac :
(i) Bul∗(a,w, c) ⊆ KDESf
(ii) Img∗(a,w, c) ⊆ KIMGf
Applied to the letter example (i.e., (5), but minus the intention), K captures
a’s mental state given by Dox and Bul∗ iff the following two conditions hold: (a)
Dox(a,w) ⊆ K1ANCH ⊕ . . . ⊕ KnANCH ⊕ KBEL, i.e., for every doxastic alternative
9The semantics below is based on (Maier 2015b), which is somewhat simpler than the semantics proposed
in (Maier 2016). The latter is more fine-grained in that it distinguishes more clearly between internal
anchors and beliefs, semantically: internal anchors, but not beliefs, provide enough detail to determine a
unique embedding verifying all internal anchors relative to any given doxastic alternative. In the current
proposal I lump together beliefs and internal anchors and drop that requirement.
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c ∈ Dox(a,w) there is an embedding f such that, in c: f (x) is an envelope, f (y)
a mailbox, f (x) is in f (y), the belief center ac sees f (x) and f (y) in front of her,
and f (x) is junk mail. In other words: the agent believes she’s seeing a piece of junk
mail in an envelope in her mailbox. The second condition, (b), says that for every
doxastic alternative c and every f that verifies the merged internal anchor DRS in
c (i.e., every f with f (x) is an envelope that ac sees in a mailbox f (y) in front of
her in c): Bul∗(a,w, c) ⊆ KDESf , i.e., f (x) is a notification of acceptance in all
buletic alternatives of the agent, relative to the background assumption of the agent
inhabiting that doxastic alternative c. In other words, (b) says that, relative to each
doxastic alternative c, with relevant letter f (x), the agent wants f (x) to be a noti-
fication of acceptance. Taken together, (a) and (b) adequately capture the belief and
hope described in the scenario: the agent believes the letter she’s looking at is a piece
of junk mail, but, hopes that it, the letter she believes she’s seeing, is a notification of
acceptance.
6 Ninan’s Objection Revisited
Now let’s revisit Ninan’s challenge to Recanati and see how our ADT deals with it.
As you’ll recall, Lucy is acquainted with Samuel Clemens, the writer, in two different
ways. On Recanati’s picture, she has two co-referential mental files, one on Clemens,
containing the information that he bears that name and is not famous, and one on
Twain, containing the information that he bears that other name and is a famous
author. In ADT we represent Lucy’s mental state at this point as containing two
internal anchors, externally anchored to the same individual, introducing two mental
discourse referents.10 Assuming that the property of being famous or not famous is
not strictly part of the acquaintance relation – the example doesn’t specify the exact
status of this information – we might represent that information in a belief box rather













10Probably, these anchors are in fact vicarious, so a more accurate representation would contain informa-
tion about how she learned about Clemens and Twain. Since the example doesn’t specify, I’m just giving
the name condition in the anchors in (17).
11Note that, with the simplified semantics above, the syntactic choice between putting something in a
belief box or an internal anchor ultimately does not really affect the psychological interpretation. This
would be different if we would interpret anchors via acceptance or take fragmentation into account.
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The ADS in (17) is a straightforward representation of this Fregean double vision
scenario. On the one hand, the wide content expressed by the belief box is the incon-
sistent proposition that Clemens is both famous and not famous. On the other hand,
the ADS in (17) captures Lucy’s narrow, psychological mental state (in w) iff in all
her doxastic alternatives there are two entities of which one is named Twain and is
famous, and the other is named Clemens and is not famous – which is not at all
inconsistent.
Now, the challenge involves Lucy imagining contrary to what she believes that
it were Clemens who is famous instead of Twain. Since we represent imagination













To be sure that this formula indeed makes sense we have to check its narrow
semantic interpretation. The ADS in (18) captures Lucy’s mental state iff (a) all
her doxastic alternatives have a verifying embedding mapping x to a famous Twain
and y to a non-famous Clemens, as above, and (b) for all doxastic alternatives c
and all anchor-verifying-embeddings f (i.e. with f (x) is named Twain in c and
f (y) is named Clemens in c): Img∗(Lucy, w, c) ⊆ KIMGf . The (b) require-
ment boils down to the condition that in all of Lucy’s imagination alternatives,
relative to each of her doxastic alternatives, f (x), the doxastic alternative’s Twain,
is not famous, but f (y), the doxastic alternative’s Clemens, is. Again, there’s no
inconsistency, and the interpretation seems to capture precisely what’s going on in
Lucy’s head, using only the tried and tested formal machinery of possible worlds
semantics.
In closing let me address one potential objection. An observant reader may well
object that the reason we avoided inconsistency is that already in (17) we chose to
represent the properties of being famous or not famous in the belief box rather than
as part of the internal anchor, contrary to what Recanati would have done in his
mental file framework. To drive this point home she could then point to Ninan’s
earlier puzzle about counterfactual de re, where we clearly have an imagination that
is inconsistent with the information represented in the internal anchor (Ninan 2008,
2012). For instance, Ralph imagines de re of the individual he is now seeing for the
first time, what it would be like if he would never have seen him (or what it would be
like if this guy had never even existed).
As it turns out the syntax and semantics provided above deals with such trickier
cases as well – in fact, I incorporated one of Ninan’s own solutions, the primitive
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two-dimensional notion of belief-relative-imagination, for just this purpose. Consider









Fully in line with the description of the case, our semantics says that (19) captures
Ralph’s (narrow) mental state if he believes there to be someone he is seeing, and
relative to all his belief alternatives c (containing at least one individual f (x) he is
seeing there (and then)), he imagines that he is not seeing f (x).
7 Conclusion
I have presented a DRT-based formal theory for the representation of complex mental
states. It analyzes singular attitudes via descriptive internal anchors that are externally
anchored to objects in the world. Much like Recanati’s mental files, ADT’s anchors
are, as Ninan puts it, “mental representations whose primary function is to carry
information about objects”.
The crucial difference between Kampian ADSs and Recanati’s mental files is
that an ADS represents the different attitudes (belief, desire, imagination) separately,
as distinct DRS boxes that all have access to the discourse referents introduced by
the anchors. In this paper I have shown that the resulting framework is expressive
enough to describe mental states involving doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes, de
se attitudes, double vision, hallucination, vicarious anchors, and, finally, Ninan’s
counterfactual attitudes.
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